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Marketization in North Korea  
- focusing on market mechanism in cooperation with the state 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Recent changes in the North Korean economy, in particular represented as 
‘marketization without liberalization’ (Smith 2009), have been drawing attention in that they 
break the stereotype of a traditional socialist economy. There are markets similar to those in 
capitalist states, where the population transacts goods and money, and enterprises are run by 
private individuals in practice.
1
 However, DPRK neither has announced a systematic reform, 
nor intentionally designed the current situation in which planning and markets are coexisting 
and intermingled. On top of this complicated situation, data about North Korea had not been 
sufficient for studying this development since the regime does not openly disclose 
information to the outside world. Therefore, it was complicated to figure out the impetus of 
marketization and to what extent marketization in North Korea has proceeded, and detailed 
analysis has been in veil for a long time. As the number of refugees from North Korea has 
been largely and constantly increasing, and the DPRK regime became more willing to 
cooperate with opening information, a good deal of studies dealing with marketization in 
North Korea has been conducted recently.
2
   
The emergence of market was a new phenomenon after the famine and the collapse 
of the PDS, which made it an interesting object of research. Studies, that set the time frame 
between the death of Kim Il-sŏng in 1994 and the 2002 economic reforms, such as Lankov 
and Kim (2008) and Joo (2010), put an emphasis on the ‘marketization from below’, which 
means population’s self-organizing market activities apart from state control. Based on 
refugee interviews, Lankov and Kim (2008) analyze the emerging North Korean “grassroots 
capitalism” by figuring out the markets’ modes of operation, the scale of them, their relations 
with the state bureaucracy and the social and political impact of them. Also based on refugee 
testimonies, Joo (2010) examines the agency 
of so called ‘shadow economy’3, and the supply and distribution mechanism of the consumer 
goods market. Choi and Koo (2005), on the other hand, investigate the dynamic change of 
                                          
1 In the North Korean context, ‘private individuals’ or ‘private entrepreneurs’ do not hold the same meaning as 
those in the capitalist states, whose private property is legally protected. As we will see in chapter 3, although 
they run private businesses, they operate their businesses under control of the state.  
2 Much of the knowledge base about the North Korean economy has also come from the international 
humanitarian and development organizations that have worked in the DPRK since the mid-1990s (Smith 2009: 
232). 
3 ‘Shadow economy’ is a term that indicates non-socialist sector in a socialist economy. ‘Second economy’ and 
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markets in three cities in North Korea – Ch’ŏngjin, Sinŭichu and Hyesan in 1990s and then 
examine the possibility that the collective agency of marketization could subvert the North 
Korean socialist system.  
 As more data have been collected due to the rapid increase of North Korean refugees, 
and markets in the DPRK are expanding at high pace, more studies shedding light on various 
topics related to marketization have been made. Smith (2009) analyzes provincial inequality 
in North Korea in relation to market opportunities of each province. Based on the data which 
the DPRK government made available to international organizations, Smith cautiously draws 
a conclusion that provincial inequality in North Korea is largely influenced by market 
opportunities such as proximity to foreigners, non-state sanctioned opportunities to buy and 
sell food, the degree of state control over local populations, and non-state sanctioned trading 
opportunities rather than agricultural productivity itself. On the other hand, studies focusing 
on the regime’s reaction to marketization have been continuously conducted as well. Yang 
(2010) analyzes the contents and the effect of the 2009 currency reform in North Korea, and 
later on Yang (2012) examines and evaluates the anti-marketization policy of North Korea in 
the 2000s.  
 Most of these studies have their focus on the consumer goods market, which is 
represented as Changmadang, and the studies achieved to deepen the understanding of 
‘marketization from below’ in North Korea. We have less understanding, however, of how 
marketization involves market mechanisms such as privatization, expansion of the labor 
market, and division of labor. Moreover, previous studies tended to overlook the cooperative 
or symbiotic relation between markets and the state. This thesis aims to understand 
marketization in the DPRK as a multifaceted phenomenon with a broader angle, which 
presents market as a mechanism and as a system that cooperates with the state.   
 
Terminology and Time-frame 
 
There are various terms which indicate phenomena related to marketization in North 
Korea, for example, informal economy, private economy (sector), second economy, and 
shadow economy. The term ‘second economy’ is most widely used among Sovietologists 
together with ‘informal economy’ and ‘shadow economy’. Grossmann (1977) defines the 
second economy as economic activities aimed for private gain or activities in contravention 
of existing law. O’Hearn (1980) argues that the second economy should include activities 
operating outside the planning structure, which are not considered in planning or not 
acknowledged officially as a part of national economy. This definition of O’Hearn is close to 
market activities that we will examine in this paper. The term ‘marketization’ in this thesis 
covers both definitions of Grossmann (1977) and O’Hearn (1980), that is,  i) economic 
activities for private gain or ii) economic activities in contravention of existing law or iii) 
economic activities operating outside the planning structure, thus including economic 
                                                                                                                                 
‘informal economy’ are used as same meaning. In earlier studies about North Korean economy, these terms were 
used frequently, while recent studies after the mid-2000s prefer to use the term ‘marketization’ (Kim and Yang 
2014: 9-10). 
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activities of state-owned enterprises’ utilizing a market, and those of private entrepreneurs’ or 
officials’ pursuing private interest. In the sense that economic activities operating outside the 
planning structure, terms such as private economy and private sector will be used in this 
thesis interchangeably with marketization as well.  
The time frame studied in this thesis is mainly from the early 2000s to the present, 
that is, the post famine period when marketization already emerged and became pervasive in 
North Korea, and for which sufficient data is available through North Korean refugee surveys, 
and studies of international organizations. In some parts of the thesis, the period from Kim Il-
sŏng era to the early 2000s (chapter 2) is dealt with to examine the historic background, and 
the period in the 1990s is covered to look into the early stage of foreign currency earning 
business (chapter 4).  
 
Approach and Sources  
 
Since “much of the best analysis of the North Korean economy is anchored in the policy 
realm, which usually used data drawn from DPRK government sources as made available to 
international organizations as a conventional source” (Smith 2009: 233), in this thesis I use 
analysis in the policy realm as main source of data, such as papers issued by KINU, KDI, 
Ministry of Unification, and BOK
4
 (see for example Lee 2007; Yang 2008; Hong 2012; Jung 
2012; Im 2013; Kwak 2013; Park 2013; Kim and Yang 2014; White Paper 2015; Ryu 2016). 
For the theoretical background, I refer to studies of other scholars in the political analysis 
field such as Rose-Ackerman (1978), White (1993), John and Putzel (2000), and Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2012), and also scholarly analysis of specialists on economic transformation 
to marketization of North Korea such as Smith (2009, 2015), Haggard and Noland (2007), 
and Lankov (2013). For examining the latest changes in North Korea I rely mainly on 
newspaper articles available online that collate information on the DPRK economy such as 
Daily NK
5
 and Radio Free Asia
6
. Based on these sources and the scholarly knowledge base, 
what this thesis offers is not new data per se, but a new composition and interpretation of 
existing data.  
 
Outline 
 
I start by presenting a historical overview of marketization in North Korea. In chapter 2, I 
present how the central planning system used to function, how it broke down after the mid-
                                          
4 KINU (Korea Institute for National Unification); KDI (Korea Development Institute); BOK (Bank of Korea). 
5 Daily NK, an online newspaper based in South Korea, reports issues relating to North Korea. The sources are 
allegedly obtained from inside North Korea via a network of informants. 
6 Radio Free Asia (RFA) is a broadcasting corporation, founded by the Broadcasting Board of Governors 
(BBG), an independent agency of the United States government, in 1996. RFA broadcasts online news, 
information, and commentary to listeners in East Asia. 
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1990s, and how this breakdown led to the emergence of markets. Finally, I also give an 
overview of marketization in the DPRK. In chapter 3, I argue that we have to approach 
marketization as the introduction and expansion of market mechanism, rather than to merely 
regard it as a simple market place. Here, I analyze bottom up marketization in North Korea 
focusing on small-scale private initiatives, and how this generated its own labor market. I 
zoom into some examples of privatization in service industry. In chapter 4, I discuss the 
political analysis of marketization, by embedding the marketization addressed in chapter 3 in 
a broader political context. After presenting theories from political analysis, I examine the 
operation of the market at the respective level in the hierarchical structure. Firstly, I look into 
foreign currency earning business and trading companies which are directly under the 
command of the authorities, then secondly, I discuss marketization at the level of factories 
and enterprises, and lastly I examine the association of local party officials with the market 
focusing on corruption issues. In the conclusion, after summing up the discussion of the 
thesis, an attempt will be made to understand the recent movements of the regime, together 
with proposals for further studies.  
 
 
2 Background 
 
2.1 Overview of the historical background (Kim Il-sŏng era - Kim Chŏng-il regime and 
the effect of the great famine in the mid-1990s)  
 
The central planning system established in North Korea under the Kim Il-sŏng  
regime, which lasted from the late 1950s to the early 1990s, developed along the lines of the 
Soviet central planning system. In this economic system, production targets are set by the 
state and are allocated to state factories and collective farms. Without private ownership and 
commercial activities, trading of grain was prohibited and, purchasing of food with rationing 
coupons became the main route for acquiring food. In subsequent years, the Public 
Distribution System (hereafter, PDS) consistently increased so that “by the early 1970s the 
state rationed almost all foodstuffs available to North Koreans and from the early 1970s, an 
increasing number of consumer goods were rationed as well” (Ibid.). The PDS that worked 
throughout almost all consumer goods including food, clothes, housing and daily 
commodities depending on the social status (sŏngbun), had been the major command of the 
official command economy in North Korea after being introduced for the first time during the 
Korean War.
7
 Various efforts were made to deter the growth of private economy such as 
                                          
7 See Haggard, S and Noland, M (2007) for more about the rationing system in the DPRK. Table 3.1 (Haggard, 
S and Noland, M 2007: 53) shows the hierarchy of entitlements in allocation at the beginning of the 1990s in 
detail. “The allocation of rations was made according to a complex system of occupation and age-related 
stratification. At the top of the hierarchy of entitlements were the military and special security forces and high-
ranking governments officials, as well as those engaged in heavy labor and in general, for those in urban areas, 
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preventing farmers from earning significant income by working on their private plots, 
running mutual surveillance groups within the population and operating a travel permit 
system. These official restrictions on private economy worked out efficiently until the early 
1990s, thereby, the allocation of resources was mainly performed by the state with a minimal 
role of the market. Therefore prices were set by the government instead of being set by 
supply and demand.  
However, in the 1990s the PDS went through a severe crisis and almost broke down. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, subsidies from the Soviet 
Union and China ceased, which North Korean industry was heavily relying on. China and 
Russia regarded North Korean policies as being economically anachronistic and as a political 
threat to north-east Asia which might bring huge instability to the region. On top of this both 
China and Russia were busy with resolving their own economic problems in the early 1990s. 
Furthermore, after the ‘first nuclear crisis’8 in 1994, there was no expected foreign economic 
assistance, which could have filled up the resource gap generated by Russian and Chinese 
economic disengagement.
9
 This was fatal not only for heavy industrial and construction 
sectors but also for agricultural sectors which depended largely on the use of agro-industrial 
products such as electricity-fed irrigation, fertilizers, chemicals and pesticides. Consequently, 
agricultural productivity declined abruptly and devastating floods in ’95 and ’96 deteriorated 
the crop production even further.  
All this worked together to cause the economic crisis in the 1990s and brought the 
great famine in the mid-1990s. The regime could not supply enough food to assure 
subsistence, nor provide basic health supplies to solve the aggravating ill health-conditions of 
the population. From 1993 to 1994, rations were increasingly delayed and delivered only 
partially, and after the repeated flood and drought from 1994 to 1998 the nearly broken PDS 
affected even the privileged population of P’yŏngyang (Lankov 2013: 78-79). It is said that 
the food shortage had been a chronic problem of the command economy due to the 
deficiencies of the rigid planning system and policies prioritizing military and heavy 
industries at the expense of consumer sectors (Joo 2010: 112). However, the food crisis of the 
mid-1990s was on a different scale in that it was transformed into a nationwide famine that 
lasted from around 1995 to 1998. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
the availability of food outside the PDS was extremely limited.” 
8 Choi, Jinwook (2006) argues that the United States wished that North Korea gave up its nuclear program in 
return for economic assistance or economic pressure, however, for North Korea the nuclear program was the 
best leverage to receive attention, food, and assistance from the outside world, and most importantly it was 
believed to provide political security for the Kim Chŏng-il regime, thus it became the program that North Korea 
would not easily give up for exchange for foreign aid. 
9 Haggard, S and Noland, M (2007) points out that the total supply depends on the ability and willingness of the 
country to maintain imports. In this regard, they argue the famine was caused by the government’s failure to 
secure adequate external supplies by earning adequate foreign exchange through exports, by borrowing, or 
through timely appeals for international aids. 
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2.2 Overview of marketization in North Korea  
 
Under this circumstance, North Korean population started to seek for survival paths 
outside the state system by bartering, selling private properties, and trading. In so doing, 
North Koreans created primitive markets and the state more or less tolerated the expansion of 
markets that helped the population to find food and income. In the economic crisis in the 
1990s, ‘farmers’ market’10 turned into a big black market that covered almost all of the 
goods including food, manufactured goods and even some producer goods. “Individuals used 
whatever resources they could find from their natural, social and political environment to 
make money” (Smith 2015: 215), for example, families started to grow food for own 
consumption and for selling on markets and engaged in small-scale production of basic goods 
like noodles and liquor. In 1995, “huge markets began to grow in North Korea’s cities and 
millions of North Koreans, women in particular
11
, began to earn the family’s income through 
trade and household handicraft production” (Lankov 2013:83). 
Studies by Lee (2007) and Yang (2006) presented that in the retail sales market, an 
absolute majority of consumers no longer buy goods through state channels, but rather utilize 
informal channels like Changmadang, which is similar to markets in the Western world and 
which became legal in the early 2000s. A study by Kim and Song (2008) estimates the size of 
the informal economy (private economy) in North Korea and tries to figure out the 
determinants and the effect of it from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, based on data 
collected from 700 North Korean refugees. In comparison to Lee (2007) and Yang (2006), 
Kim and Song (2008) has a larger number of respondents and attempt to estimate the size of 
the informal economy and to understand the modes of informal economic activities. The 
survey shows that the majority of respondents have participated in informal economic 
activities (hereafter, IEA) by showing that a total of 78% of the survey respondents reported 
to have worked in informal sectors and additionally 74% of jobholders in the formal economy 
also have engaged in IEA (Kim and Song 2008: 370-371). The study classifies the type of 
informal work into three categories: 1. private plot-related activities, 2. stockbreeding and 
other activities including street vending (food, fish), making consumer goods for sale, and 3. 
smuggling. From this categorization, it is illustrative in which ways individuals engage in 
market activities. The study also shows the distribution channels of basic food and 
agricultural products and proves that consumption of those goods through the official channel 
such as state-run shops and the rationing channel does not exceed 20% of the total 
consumption. According to the study, participation in IEA seemed to be driven by low income 
from the formal sector, and the higher income in IEA, thereby affecting labor supply in the 
                                          
10 Farmers’ market itself was a legal system in which farmers could sell some of their own produced crops and 
animal products to other citizens. It was held every 10 days and transaction of grain such as corns and rice and 
manufactured goods was prohibited. 
11 Women made up the majority of North Korea’s market players at the beginning, since male population was 
bound to collective labor forced by the state. 
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formal sector negatively. 
 
 
3 Bottom up Marketization in North Korea  
- focusing on small-scale privatization  
 
In this chapter, we approach marketization from a broader angle, beyond the narrow scope 
and limited understanding that stems from focusing on the physical marketplace where 
consumer goods are traded. The market is also a system that organizes the allocation of 
resources in the economy. In the market mechanism, the market is the main system for 
allocating scarce resources in an economy such as labor and capital. In other words, the 
market lets the players decide what to produce, how to produce and for whom to produce. 
Prices are determined by the interaction between supply and demand, and they incentivize 
market players including households and enterprises to decide how to allocate their resources 
(Yang 2014: 56). 
 When approached from this perspective, it is useful to borrow Yang’s framework 
(2006) to understand the marketization in the DPRK. Yang (2006) analyzes the level of 
marketization in North Korea by examining three indicators used for measuring the degree of 
systemic transition of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the early period of their 
transition from a socialist economy. He stresses that the framework of ‘regime transition’ 
should be applied cautiously to North Korea since the DPRK has not officially announced a 
regime transition as witnessed in the Soviet Union or other Central European states. Yet, he 
assumes that when focusing on the behavior of individual economic subjects rather than on 
the legal and institutional context, the transition framework developed in a report by the 
EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) is helpful. Six fundamental 
indices for evaluating transition are summarized as follows: large-scale privatization, small-
scale privatization, enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange 
system, bank reform. Based on refugee interviews, Yang focuses on the three indices which 
are small-scale privatization, price liberalization and enterprise restructuring to examine the 
level of marketization in North Korea.
12
  
In this chapter, we address small-scale privatization in detail, since private ownership 
is a fundamental factor of a market economy and it relates to the creation of a new form of 
labor market. Small-scale privatization has made it possible to hire labor in the private sector 
and to organize a division of labor, which works as the basis of market economy.  
                                          
12 According to Yang (2006), since large-scale privatization and bank reform have barely happened in North 
Korea, those two indicators are excluded in the analysis. Trade and foreign exchange system seems to have 
changed to a certain degree, but refugee interviews do not allow a good understanding of the level of change, 
thereby, this index in not included in his study either.  
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3.1 Privatization level 
 
In principle, in socialist states like the DPRK, ‘private property’ does not legally 
exist. Means of production belong to the state and the people are required to work at state-run 
farms, factories or enterprises. No individual is permitted to own private profit from 
production, thus people should rely on the distribution system to get life necessities including 
food, clothes, houses and so on. As the PDS ceased to perform its original function the 
population began to mobilize all resources they could make use of, such as land, livestock 
and labor, and gains from market participation consequently turned into private property. In 
most of the cases, private gains merely managed to support living, nevertheless some 
managed to earn more than the minimum income for survival and they were able to organize 
their own business. The scale of privatization and organizing one’s own business shows a 
deviation depending on owners and area of business. In the following, small-scale 
privatization will be examined by looking at various cases which show how a new labor 
market and the division of work within it developed.  
 The survey of Yang (2006) shows that the privatization level is low when it comes to 
state-owned industrial factories and enterprises both in center and local areas. The majority of 
the interviewees answered that the percentage of these factories and enterprises run by 
individuals is between 0% and 10%. However, in other sectors such as restaurants, shops, 
service stores
13
 and trading companies, it can be assumed that privatization has proceeded to 
a certain degree. On average, 30% of these sectors are estimated to be run by private owners 
and in particular, restaurants show almost 50% of privatization level. Shops and service stores 
show a privatization level above 40%. In the case of small-scale privatization, the survey 
concludes that approximately 70% of the adult population was participating in market 
activities. Another study by Yoon (2013) supports the argument that small-scale privatization 
is present to a certain extent in the DPRK. In the study, refugees were asked about the ratio of 
privately owned means of production. The answer that there were “plenty” or “some” of 
privately owned means of production vary from sector to sector, with the percentage of 
privatization being 32.6% in mines, 59.0% in fishing ships, 71.2% in government-purchase 
stores, 79.2% in restaurants, 73.8% in freight cars, 81.8% in noodle factories, and 79.4% in 
artificial meat. This confirms the findings of the survey of Yang (2006), where it is also found 
that privatization levels in restaurants, shops and service sector are considerably high.  
 
3.2 Privatization and the organization of labor market 
 
Private ownership inevitably relates to private employment, such as ship owners with 
laborers in fisheries, individual mine owners with laborers in mining, owners of restaurants or 
stores with clerks in the service industry, and land owners with tenant farmers in farming 
                                          
13 Service stores in North Korea include shops such as sauna, barber shop, repair shop, and leisure-related stores 
like karaoke and billiard hall.  
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(Kim and Yang 2014:43). Although the private ownership of means of production is legally 
prohibited, advanced marketization has led to privatization in practice. Furthermore, this 
privatization impacted the labor market through a division of labor. The next paragraphs look 
into the organization of private employment by looking into some cases.  
 Mining industry is one of the key industries in the DPRK and used to be run by 
state-enterprises, however, private management in the mining industry is reported. A typical 
way of running this business privately is as follows (Ibid., 59-61): first, individuals gain the 
right for the management of mines from the executives of state-run mining companies. 
Individuals and the executives agree to give a name which suggests that the mine is run by 
the state, and individuals pay an official commission to the original state-enterprise and in 
many cases also bribe government officials. Then the new manager secures capital, either 
through self-finance or through private loans, and labor. Labor are often workers who have 
worked at the state enterprises before or from the labor market in general. Running an 
abandoned mine has been regarded as an investment target for the new rich in North Korea, 
since it is a practical way to earn foreign currency from exports to China. The right for 
managing small-middle scale mines is said to be transacted at the price of $ 3,000 between 
the new rich and officials in mining industry.
14
 Some even excavate small-size mines around 
abandoned mines once run by the state and the owners of these new mines are said to employ 
five to ten workers for mining.
15
 
 In the manufacturing industry, the division of labor sticks out more clearly. Clothes 
manufacture, which is called “Ssŏnaeki (써래기)”, is a good example to look at.16 The name 
comes from the word “ssŏlta (썰다)” which describes the process of cutting fabric according 
to the sample size of the product from a pile of fabric. In earlier times, this large scale of 
clothes manufacturing was not imaginable unless being done by state factories, until a female 
merchant managed to invest private capital and produce a great amount of products. When 
the merchant acquired information that the Youth Union would hold a Taekwondo contest and 
the participants were told to prepare uniforms for the contest, she ordered fabric from other 
merchants in border cities. Next, the cloth was sent to hired workers who tailored the 
purchased fabric, and subsequently to individual workers who sewed the clothes. The 
finished uniforms were sold to merchants either by payment on the spot or by credit, and 
finally the uniforms reached to Changmadangs in different cities. When there was new 
demand, this clothes producing system run by Ssŏnaeki started to operate again. In this way 
capital and labor is organized to meet the demand of the market, and the division of labor has 
been developed. Division of production and labor seems to have proceeded apace as the 
import of fabric has increased steeply while the import of clothes has decreased, allegedly a 
                                          
14 Daily NK 2015-04-09  
15 Radio Free Asia (hereafter, RFA) 2015-08-04  
16 Daily NK 2007-12-14  
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consequence of an increase in the number of individual clothes manufacturers.
17
   
 Private production and private employment have enlarged their scale as individual 
manufacturers even rent state-run facilities such as machine factories of coal mines for shoe 
production.
18
 To lend facilities to the private entrepreneur is beneficial for the officials of 
state-run factories since they can earn additional profits from the restricted raw material and 
labor. In many cases entrepreneurs pay 30% of the sales profit as a rent for the facilities, and 
therefore, when the business is regarded as a profitable one, officials decide to lend facilities 
to private entrepreneurs. For private entrepreneurs, it is essential to rent state-run factories 
which can provide stable electricity to conduct large scale production of shoes. Although this 
state-run factory rental is taking place within only a few factories for security reasons, it 
proves the growth of private manufacturing and the progress of privatization in the DPRK. 
The division of labor becomes apparent by looking at the shoe manufacturing process.
19
 It 
has created a number of labor market segments involved in the respective procedures of 
manufacturing shoes such as providing raw material, cutting out the upper leather, producing 
the rubber sole, making the shoestrings, manufacturing the middle layer of the shoe sole and 
processing finished goods. The general procedures of manufacturing shoes are similar to the 
case of Ssŏnaeki. Manufacturers purchase raw material from retailers who import it from 
China and distribute it to each manufacturing step, which takes place in households or rented 
factory facilities where family, students, or factory workers are hired. In the final steps, the 
manufacturers produce finished goods ready to be sold at the market. In this way, shoe 
manufacturing procedures that are closely tied with a fine distribution network, involve 
private employment that reacts to supply and demand of the market. 
 
3.3 Privatization in Service Industry 
 
 One of the sectors which illustrates small-scale privatization most explicitly is     
the service industry. As seen from the studies of Yang (2006) and Yoon (2013), the 
privatization level is reported to be considerably high in service industry which includes 
restaurants, shops, and transportation industry. Another survey, conducted by Kim and Yang 
(2012), about the actual ratio of state enterprises run by individuals shows that even in the 
case of state enterprises, the privatization level in service industry is quite high. According to 
the survey asking refugees who left the DPRK between 2007 and 2009, more than half of the 
stores (51.3%) and restaurants (58.5%) that used to be run by the state are now operated by 
individuals in practice. It can be due to the fact that service industry such as wholesale and 
retail, food and lodging industry, and transportation industry do not require large scale capital 
or elaborated technology, thus it has been easy for individuals to start their business privately. 
                                          
17 RFA 2016-10-17  
18 Daily NK 2015-10-27  
19 Daily NK 2016-03-24  
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To what extent the expansion of service industry in the private sector would lead to economic 
growth in the DPRK still remains in question, however, it is undeniable that a considerable 
amount of income from private economy in North Korea comes from participating in the 
service industry. Kwak (2013) argues that formal income composed of the monthly salary 
paid by the state and rationing takes only 12.5% of the household income and 87.5% of 
household income is filled by informal income. This informal income is mainly earned from 
service industry such as merchandising (48.8%), transportation (11.5%), other types of small-
scale service (9.4%) and private finance (10.0%). 
 Transportation business including buses and freight cars is a good example that 
shows privatization in service industry. The most representative transportation in North Korea 
is a freight car or bus called sŏbisŭch’a (써비차), which is a compound word of service and 
car.
20
 In and after the severe economic crisis in the mid-1990s due to deficiency of fuel and 
electricity, trains and cars could not operate any longer. Under the condition that capability 
for transportation in the nation was more or less paralyzed, state organizations and state 
enterprises started to utilize their vehicles to make a profit.
21
 They transported passengers 
and freight and with the profit from this business they could support rationing or purchasing 
resources for production. Later on, as marketization progressed to a certain extent, the new 
rich who had built up their own capital began to purchase used trucks from China or Japan 
and started to utilize them for transportation business. In this case, owners of vehicles register 
self-owned transportation as state-owned asset and hire drivers privately. With the permit for 
running a vehicle gained from officials of state enterprises, owners can run a transportation 
business by carrying passengers or goods from city to city. Owners pay a certain amount of 
the profit to officials, which is taken for officials’ private benefit and also recorded as profit 
of state enterprises. Operation of Service-cars has made a smooth transportation of people 
and goods throughout the country feasible, and thus has stimulated active transaction through 
the market across the nation. There have been trials to control privately running 
transportation business in 2010 and 2015. However, cracking down service-car business 
seems to be highly improbable since service-cars hold responsibility for a considerable 
amount of transactions, and profit from running service-cars is beneficial for state enterprises, 
and since only foreign currency is accepted as fare. 
The importance of growth of service industry lies in the fact that it promotes 
interaction between different sectors of the market. For instance, Ssŏnaeki or shoe 
manufacturing industry studied beforehand would have not been possible without support of 
transportation business. Distributors who connect traders and wholesalers, wholesalers and 
retailers, and retailers and consumers have enhanced market size and promoted division of 
labor across the market. 
 
                                          
20 Daily NK 2010-10-26 , RFA 2017-01-09  
21 State’s running transportation business will be dealt with in Chapter 4 later on again, from the perspective of 
state-enterprises’ participation in commercial activities.  
13 
 
4 Marketization embedded in a political context 
 
Since marketization is regarded as an economic phenomenon at a first glance, it is no 
surprise that most of the studies about marketization in the DPRK have been made by 
economists. This economic analysis on marketization of DPRK is based on the perspective 
such as ‘marketization from below’ or ‘self-generated marketization’ while assuming that the 
expansion of marketization is a threat to the regime and thus takes hostile stance with the 
state (Park, Hyeongjung 2012). ‘Self-generated marketization theory’ puts an emphasis on the 
role of economic subjects at the bottom such as households and enterprises, and argues that 
marketization in North Korea took place naturally as the population sought for a survival path 
(Yang 2014: 72).
22
 This analysis is effective in analyzing the emergence of Changmadang 
after mid-1990s as we have looked into in the earlier chapter and it is useful to examine the 
behavior of economic subjects like households as well.  
 
State-involved marketization theory 
 
However, we should not be buried only in this perspective to have a comprehensive 
understanding of marketization in the DPRK. Another approach starts from the assumption 
that there exists a certain power related to the state which leads marketization.
23
 Political 
analysis in the study of markets pays attention to the way in which power and power relations 
influence the structure and operation of markets in reality. This interest in the influence of 
power and power relations criticizes that economic analysis tends to overlook the importance 
of power and to marginalize the impact of power relations (Park Hyeongjung 2012: 208). 
‘Power-involved marketization theory’ regards the role of political organizations as being 
important motives in the expansion of marketization in the DPRK. It puts an emphasis on 
foreign currency earning while embracing Changmadang which takes place at the bottom of 
the hierarchical structure. These two approaches should be seen as complementary, rather 
than opposite or exclusive. 
In the previous chapter we have studied the evidence of self-generated marketization 
in the DPRK. We have seen a complex market economy with focus on privatization and 
private employment involving division of work and the emergence of service industry. In this 
chapter, we will embed the concept of self-generated marketization into a broader political 
context. Firstly, I present the theories from the political analysis on markets which can be 
applied in examining marketization in North Korea. Secondly, based on a political analytic 
                                          
22 For the studies taking this perspective, see Haggard, S and Noland, M (2007).; Lankov, A and Kim, 
Seokhyang (2008).; Yang, Moonsoo (2010).P'aju: Hanul Ak'ademi.; Smith, H (2015).  
23 For the studies taking this perspective, see Choi, Bongdae (2011).; Choi, Bongdae (2014).; Park, Hyeongjung 
(2011).; Hong, Min (2012).  
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view I will examine marketization in the DPRK. It will be examined how North Korea’s 
unique political system is formulating the hierarchical structure of the market and influencing 
the operation of the market at the respective level in the hierarchical structure.  
 
4.1 Theories 
 
White (1993) – the politics of state involvement  
 
Using a power-based notion of politics, White identifies the politics of markets as a 
complex process involving four different types of power as follows:  
 
“(…) the politics of state involvement involving state power; the politics of 
market organization involving internal association power; the politics of market 
structure involving economic power; and the politics of social embeddedness 
involving various forms of social/cultural/ideological power” (White 1993: 1-2). 
 
In his argument, the “political process of conflict and cooperation, and political relations of 
domination and subordination” (Ibid., 3) are reflected in market structures and market 
operations. In the analysis of markets in North Korea, the first type of market power, that is, 
the politics of state involvement, could prove most useful and here I focus on presenting state 
power in relation to markets, since the conditions for the three other types of power are yet to 
be ripened to work in practice in the case of North Korea.  
There are two common forms of state involvement in markets. In the first type, the 
state is directly involved in a market by exerting direct control over production, accumulation 
or exchange. State-run farms/factories/enterprises in the DPRK can be the perfect examples 
that show the state as a direct participant in the market. As White points out, state enterprises 
play a monopolistic role in providing key industrial inputs such as energy and basic raw 
materials like steel and coal in North Korea, even though this role has been largely shrunk 
after the mid-1990s.  
The second type of state involvement in markets is through regulation which has 
“several layers of market penetration” (Ibid., 5). The layers vary from the basic level such as 
policy intervention by the government to facilitate market operations, correcting market 
distortions, and achieving social and developmental goals to a deeper level of institutional 
arrangements such as the legal protection of property rights, licensing laws, creation and 
validation of money and the regulation of contracts. In the case of the DPRK, selling the right 
for trade and permission for travelling are representative examples of state involvement in 
markets through imposing regulations.  
Two dimensions of state involvement, with the state as a direct player in the market 
and with the state as a regulator of the market, will be studied in detail in 4.2.  
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Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) – inclusive/extractive political institutions 
 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) focus on the role of political and economic 
institutions which determine prosperity or poverty of the country. They argue that “while 
economic institutions are critical for determining whether a country is poor or prosperous, it 
is politics and political institutions that determine what economic institutions a country has” 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012: 43). Acemoglu and Robinson identify two different types of 
institutions; inclusive ones and extractive ones which lead to different consequences.  
Inclusive institutions “secure private property, an unbiased system of law, and a 
provision of public services that provides a playground where people can exchange and 
contract; also permit the entry of new businesses and allow people to choose their careers” 
(Ibid., 74). Inclusive institutions offer economic incentives for education, saving and 
investing, and innovating and adopting new technologies which are essential for economic 
growth. In particular, securing private property is said to be critical for promoting investment 
and increasing productivity. Though securing property rights or providing public services can 
be provided by markets to a certain extent, the central authority is essential to impose 
coercive order and to do so on a large scale. Therefore, the state plays a fundamental role in 
operating economic institutions “as the enforcer of law and order, private property, and 
contracts, and often as a key provider of public services”. (Ibid.)  
On the other hand, institutions which have opposite properties to inclusive ones are 
called extractive institutions. They are “extractive” because they are “designed to extract 
incomes and wealth from one subset of society to benefit a different subset” (Ibid.). Since 
power is concentrated in the hands of a small elite group, barely no constraints are put on the 
exercise of concentrated power and on structuring economic institutions to extract resources 
for their own sake. Extractive economic institutions enrich the elite, and wealth and power of 
the elite strengthens the ruling power in a vicious circle.  
Acemoglu and Robinson examine the cases of North and South Korea after the 
division in 1953, which lead to the conclusion that different institutions in two countries 
brought different results in their economic trajectories. Extractive economic institutions of 
North Korea do not secure private property and the legal system is mainly used as an arm of 
the ruling Korean Workers’ Party. This comes from the absolutist political institutions which 
set up economic institutions to enrich the elite of the Korean Workers’ Party at the expense of 
society. By contrast, South Korea, although it did not have completely inclusive institutions, 
achieved rapid industrialization by allocation of resources by the state under General Park 
who ran an absolutist political regime, and after that it transited towards inclusive political 
institutions in the 1980s.  
However, it should not be concluded that extractive institutions in North Korea are 
exactly the same as seen in other countries since the way power is distributed differs from 
country to country. While taking the unique and specific situation of the DPRK into account, 
it will be examined in which way and to what extent extractive political/economic institutions 
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work in marketization of North Korea later on in 4.2. 
 
John and Putzel (2000) – political settlements 
 
As a setting in which social actors interact, John and Putzel (2000) regard “a 
common understanding, usually between political elites” (John and Putzel 2000: 4) as a 
fundamental background. This common understanding, in other words, ‘political settlements’ 
serve the best interests or beliefs of (political) elites through administering political power. 
Political settlements influence the structure of property rights and entitlements, and in so 
doing they can assign more distributional advantages to certain social actors than to others. 
They impose limited access to valuable resources such as land, labor, and capital, or to 
profitable activities such as property rights protection, trade, contract enforcement, and so on 
(Ibid., 14). In short, political settlements are essentially about the distribution of rents in the 
society. As a state plays a main role as a coercive enforcer in structuring political and 
economic institutions in the study of Acemoglu and Robinson, political organizations like 
political parties are said to be the most effective entities in shaping political settlements.  
According to John and Putzel, political settlements are central to understanding the 
different trajectories of developing states and the directions of reform that a state might take, 
and to assessing state stability and resilience. In this sense, approaching marketization of 
North Korea from the angle of political settlements appears to be beneficial. In particular, as 
John and Putzel point out, “the ideological role of the political organization” (Ibid., 16) 
should not be overlooked. In the case of North Korea, it should be examined how the regime 
tries to project administrative authority and coercive power in forming political settlements. 
In 4.2, it will be studied in which way political settlements in the DPRK are distributing rents 
for the sake of the state, together with the properties of extractive institutions. 
 
4.2 Operation of the market at the respective level in the hierarchical structure 
4.2.1 Foreign currency earning business and trading companies  
As explained in the previous section, political analysis of the market assumes that the main 
motive, which drags marketization, comes from the commercial activities of authorities or 
organizations of political power. ‘Power-involved marketization theory’ sees a hierarchical 
structure in the market, with state-departments related to foreign currency earning business at 
the top of the hierarchy while emerging capitalists called Tonchu being situated below, local 
governments coming after, and retailers and producers who collect or produce exporting 
goods being located at the bottom of the pyramid (Yang 2014: 73). It argues that the main 
force which drives marketization comes from the special administrative units that support 
foreign currency earning business, such as Office #38 (special department in the Korean 
Workers’ Party codenamed Room 38), Office #39 and the involved departments, Security 
17 
 
Headquarters, organizations under the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces 
(Inminmuryŏkpu), State Security Department (Kukkaanjŏnbowibu), and the Ministry of 
People’s Security (Inminboanbu) (Ibid.). 
 Here, we will examine how foreign currency earning business began to develop, and 
has been operating, and how this business and trading companies are associated with 
marketization.  
 
Development of foreign currency earning business  
 
 The origin of foreign currency earning business goes back to ‘Korean Workers’ Party 
economy’ that belonged to Office #39, which was directly under Kim Chŏng-il’s command. 
The Workers’ Party installed management offices nationwide and gained huge profit by 
monopolizing the privilege for export through these offices. For example, when people 
collect products such as mushrooms, minerals and fish, management offices purchase these at 
low price and export the products at higher price to markets abroad including China and 
Japan. With the income earned from the export, offices purchase cheap merchandise from 
capitalist markets abroad, and in this way offices earn considerable profit. In the 1980s, 
however, monopolizing power of the Workers’ Party became weakened and organizations 
under the military and security department started to jump into foreign currency earning 
businesses as well. With the economic crisis in the 1990s, North Korean authorities 
commanded that each organization and state-enterprise should earn foreign currency on their 
own and solve the distribution problem by their own as well (Park 2011: 220). Against this 
background, the ‘new trade system’ was introduced in 1991, which allowed the respective 
department under the cabinet and local administrative district to found trading companies. 
This action motivated a bunch of organizations belonging to the Workers’ Party, cabinet and 
the military to establish their own trading companies to earn foreign currency. Thus, in the 
early 1990s it is shown that almost all kinds of merchandise were mobilized for being sold 
abroad by these organizations (Ibid., 221-222). The range of merchandise varies from raw 
materials such as mineral products like placer gold, zinc, iron ore, and coal, forest products 
including mushroom, bracken, Omija, and wood, and fishery products like shell, pollock, sea 
urchin roe, sea cucumber and eel, to scrap iron, antique, opium, and used cars.  
In the mid-1990s, when the PDS almost broke down, foreign currency earning 
business by organizations and enterprises expanded even more. After the death of Kim Il-
sŏng in 1994, military authorities gained dominant power over the Workers’ Party under the 
Kim Chŏng-il regime with an emphasis on Sŏn’gun politics (= military first policy). Kim 
Chŏng-il assigned management power of the national economy to the military and it received 
a huge privilege in the trading business, and therefore, the Ministry of the People’s Armed 
Forces monopolized all the resources for export. Since the early 2000s foreign trading 
expanded, driven by the rapid growth of China. Demand for resources from China increased 
largely along with the economic growth, and resources that North Korea needed could be 
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easily acquired from China as well (Kim and Yang 2014: 144-145). Though foreign trading 
business is controlled by the authorities, as we will study later in this chapter, foreign 
currency earning business is deeply associated with market economy and is being operated 
with marketization. 
 
Operation of foreign currency earning business 
 
Since the operation of foreign currency earning businesses is centered on trading companies, 
it is important to understand the structure and properties of trading companies. According to 
the trade law of the DPRK Article 10, “Trading companies are in charge of export and import. 
Business related to export and import is done by trading companies that are founded and 
received business license by law.”24 At a glance, they look similar to trading companies in 
capitalist states, however, trading companies in North Korea have unique characteristics.  
Firstly, they should belong to either cabinet or the party or the military.
25
 Maepong 
trading company (which is known to have changed its name to Gwangmyŏng trading 
company in 2000), founded in 1980, is one of the most representative foreign currency 
earning institutions and is under direct control of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces.  
Another active trading company, Pirobong trading company (founded in 1998) belongs to the 
same authority as well. Both Chosŏn Taesŏng trading company and Chosŏn Taehŭng trading 
company, which exert powerful influence, belong to Office #39. Taesŏng trading company 
belonging to the party and Maepong trading company under the military are known as two 
major trading companies in the DPRK. China and Japan are the main trade partners trading 
used cars, medicinal herb, mining products and fishery products with China, and mainly 
fishery products with Japan at the high sea on the East Sea.
26
  
 Secondly, even though a company belongs to the party, or cabinet or the military, it is 
not possible to get the permission for founding a trading company unless it owns a source for 
foreign currency earning, for instance, ‘production base (factories)’ or ‘source base (fishery 
product, forest product, etc) (Jung 2012: 9). Chosŏn Chungsŏng trading company owns herb 
source base and a laboratory to produce medicine as a pharmaceutical company, and Chosŏn  
Ŭnha trading company, which is the biggest clothes improvement trading company in the 
DPRK, has about 20 garment factories. Trading companies in North Korea, thus, are not only 
in charge of selling and distributing goods but are also responsible for production.  
In addition to the capability of production, trading companies in North Korea should 
gain Wak (와크) to do business. Wak, an export license or quota for particular kinds of 
                                          
24 http://world.moleg.go.kr/KP/law/19128?astSeq=585 (North Korea Laws Information Center). 
25 For more details about the list of North Korean trading companies and their affiliation, see Jung, Eun-e  
(2012). Based on the data from KOTRA (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency), Ministry of Unification,  
and refugee interviews, Jung collected the list of trading companies and classified the affiliation of each  
company.  
26 Daily NK 2007-03-18  
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merchandise, is essential in the foreign currency earning business in the DPRK after having 
been issued from the ‘Korean Workers’ Party economy’ for the first time. How much Wak is 
assigned to a certain trading company depends on the political power relations between the 
party, cabinet and the military and is decided by the leader. In the ‘military first politics’ era, 
trading companies under military authorities gained most of Wak, however, in the new era of 
Kim Chŏng-ŭn it seems that a considerable part of it is transferred to the party from the 
military as the power of the party is strengthened with the new leader.  
 Profit gained from foreign currency earning business, based on the exclusive rights 
of trading companies, is used for financing organizations under the party, cabinet and the 
military. Some part of the profit also goes to related executives for private wealth 
accumulation. The structure of foreign currency earning companies is as follows: 
 
On the top, there is a headquarter which is directly managed by the party, cabinet 
and the military. Trading companies are located below and they run branch 
offices in each province. Then this branch office has several local offices in 
counties or in cities. Location of local offices mainly relies on the location of 
natural sources. Under a local office, there exists a smaller branch office where 
the purchase of source is taking place. Here local residents can exchange sources 
that they collected or produced with food or daily necessities. Border towns 
where customs are located also have branch offices that deal with export and 
import (Jung 2012: 14).  
 
Association of foreign currency earning business and trading companies with 
marketization 
 
The association of the foreign currency earning business and trading companies with 
marketization cannot be explained without considering the Wak system.
27
 For example, 
organizations under the military firstly install a source base of fishery product and a branch 
office in the major harbor cities. In principle, collection and distribution of fishery products is 
done by military troops, however, the military is not able to conduct this procedure because 
of lack of finance and labor. As a solution, private enterprises or individuals were given the 
management rights through Wak , under the condition that it still runs under the name of a 
military organization officially.
28
 Individuals mobilize finance and labor, proceed practical 
affairs related to export, and share the profit with the military. To have the shield of the 
military has a certain advantage since it is relatively free from interventions from other 
                                          
27 Here, the explanation about the operation of trading companies under the protection of the military owes to 
Park 2011: 225-227.  
28 This is similar to the cases that we have looked at in the chapter 3, where private entrepreneurs rent facilities 
from state-run factories or enterprises to run their own business under the condition that they keep the name of 
state organizations. In chapter 3, we studied the cases of mining business and shoe-manufacturing business.  
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administrative institutions. In particular in the era of ‘military first politics’, private 
entrepreneurs or merchants and the military existed in symbiotic relations. Three main 
conditions for export business, that is, “quota for export (Wak), securing export source, and 
transport-means”, were assured by the military.  
This transaction between political organizations and the private sector does not only 
apply to the organizations under military authorities. Other state-run trading companies are 
also known to utilize private merchants in the procedure of gathering export goods and 
supplying imported goods to the domestic market. Here, transferring Wak to emerging 
capitalists with high renting fee often takes a large part of income of trading companies under 
state organizations.
29
 In particular, it is said that at the end of the year more transfers take 
place since trading companies have a pressure to earn the allocated ‘loyalty funds’ which go 
to the state. Transaction of Wak is forbidden in principle, however, trading Wak between 
trading institutions or between trading companies and private individuals is not difficult to 
find in the DPRK.  
 Association with the market is also found at the bottom level of profit sharing of 
trading companies. Here, we see how the population and end units are involved in foreign 
currency earning business of trading companies in the case of mushroom and medicinal 
herb.
30
 When the command of collecting medicinal herb is given to the branch office from 
the headquarter, the branch office sets up a ‘local office’ in the county or in the city nearby of 
the district producing herbs. Then a local office installs a branch office in the producing area. 
This branch office hires and sends workers from outside who are capable of purchasing herbs 
to the site where they can purchase herbs from residents. People bring herbs they collected 
individually from mountains to the branch office and get goods such as sugar, food, and daily 
necessities for the price, which they can most easily cash in at the market. Remainders after 
self-consumption are sold or exchanged with other goods at the market. ‘Source-purchase 
instructors’ hand in the allocated quota of herb and they sell the surplus of goods to a broker 
transacting with China or sell the surplus by themselves at the market. Herb gathered at the 
local office is directly sent to local offices in the border towns owning customs, and is 
officially exported to China. Allocated foreign currency earned from trading is submitted to 
the headquarter and the remainder of profit is used for importing merchandise from China. 
Some of the imports are first transacted at the warehouse of trading companies with 
wholesale merchants, who distribute products to markets all over the country. Consequently, 
as the size of trading companies is enlarging and foreign currency earning business is 
growing, the amount of transactions in the market and the scale of the consumer goods 
markets are expanding. 
 Even though foreign currency earning business is cooperating with marketization and 
has an aspect of promoting marketization to a certain extent, we should be cautious about 
                                          
29 Daily NK 2015-12-08  
30 This part with the operation of foreign currency earning process of mushroom and medicinal herb owes to 
Jung 2012: 24-25. 
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drawing a conclusion that this business leads to transformation to capitalism directly. It lacks 
forward and background linkage effects with other industrial fields since it mainly relies on 
the unilinear export/import path, via export of mining goods and collected resources such as 
forest products and fishery products on the one hand side, and import of substitute materials 
like food and light industry goods on the other hand side. This can be explained by the fact 
that boosted marketization related to foreign currency earning is focusing on stabilizing the 
regime and securing the interest of political organizations rather than on transformation into a 
new system. Periodic abolition and consolidation of trading companies also shows that 
operating of these companies can be easily influenced by the will of the regime. For instance, 
strong censorship on trading companies and foreign currency earning individuals in 1996 
ended up deactivating a couple of major trading companies under military authorities. In 
2010, another measure was taken by the Korean Workers’ Party to disband trading companies 
under military authorities except trading companies controlled directly by North Korea’s 
Trade Department.
31
 It is assumed that by suppressing trading companies and the market, the 
Party tried to set a new economic order through sale and distribution of goods by state-run 
stores.  
 
4.2.2 At the level of factories and enterprises (non-foreign currency earning businesses) 
 
State-factories and enterprises cooperating with the market 
 
Association with the market can be also observed in the operation of state-owned factories or 
enterprises. Here, we see how state-factories and enterprises are cooperating with the market, 
and how the authorities deal with private enterprises. There are two different opinions about 
market-related economic activities of state-owned enterprises in the DPRK (Im 2013). One is 
the analysis that actual marketization proceeds in a way such that most of the activities of 
state-owned enterprises are composed of non-planned activities, utilizing the market actively 
while maintaining the appearance of state-owned enterprises. The other opinion is, that the 
situation is nothing more than limited marketization of enterprises, and argues that major 
state-owned enterprises are still under control of national planning even though the planned 
economic system is often assessed to be broken down. It is hard to say that one of the two 
taken alone explains the situation of North Korea. We should rather focus on the assumption 
that these two phenomena are intermingled, and on the fact that marketization of enterprises, 
in the narrow as well as in the broad perspective has accelerated recently.  
 First, we examine how state-owned enterprises are making use of the market and are 
forming a relation with market at the respective step of carrying out the plan. Firstly, at the 
                                          
31 Daily NK 2010-01-20  
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stage of setting the plan, a manager takes the market situation into account in his decision 
making. Managers try to figure out the possibility of using Tonchu (emerging capitalists), the 
sort of usable resources, and their amount available in the market (Ibid., 52).
32
 As the lack of 
resources became severe, state planning was distorted and has been malfunctioning, and only 
managing to meet the direct commands from the leader. Accordingly, state planning given by 
the cabinet became even less powerful, so that the goal of state-owned factories and 
enterprises became to meet just the minimum of the allocated production. For example, a 
construction company which has 10 work groups put 3 groups to work on the state-plan, and 
the remaining 7 groups were often mobilized to produce profits by involving in 8.3 line
33
 
production or private construction work of Tonchu (Ibid., 53). In the case of factories or 
enterprises in the local area, the importance of state-planning and that of self-reliant planning 
was reversed even more. Since daily-necessities and raw materials for production were not 
provided sufficiently from the state, it was even harder to meet the plan and the state could 
not exert forcing power easily.   
 Secondly, at the stage of production, factories and enterprises secure resources that 
are not supplied by the state from the market such as food, raw materials, transportation 
means, operational funds and labor. Sometimes there exist pseudo-contract manufacturing 
relations between factories and merchants, often in the case of producing light industry goods 
with relatively high profitability.
34
 In particular, association with the market is revealed more 
explicitly from the ‘double’ manufacturing and selling procedure of goods. Goods 
manufactured for meeting the state-planned allocation have a lower quality for not containing 
luxurious additives to meet the state-set price, while on the other hand, goods manufactured 
to be sold at the market by merchants have a relatively high quality. The latter products are 
sold at the market at the wholesale price and compose a certain portion of the income that 
light industry factories earn. In the case of a construction company, if there is no finance 
provided by the state, the company searches for Tonchu. The company works on the 
construction project and with the profit earned from this project, the company can meet the 
allocated profit. However, it is often pointed out by the testimonies of North Korean refugees, 
that in the case of large scale state-owned factories or enterprises, relying on the market for 
production is rare and is made very cautiously only when necessary. In general, when it 
comes to munitions factories, the portion of 8.3 production is small, except in a few cases 
where munitions factories produce 8.3 goods to sell these at the market when there is demand 
of city population (Choi 2014: 178). For example, P’yŏngyang Electricity company 
                                          
32 However, in the case of the field where the state strategically chooses to support and command detailed 
production goal, it is difficult to adjust the set plan. In particular, when the state provides supplies for production, 
assignments for factories and enterprises should be regarded as a foremost goal.  
33 8.3 line is a production line that manufactures daily necessities by using waste materials from the original 
production. Nowadays, it means a production line out of state-planning in general.  
34 See Chapter 3 of this thesis, where it is explained how pseudo-contract manufacturing relation between 
factory and merchants works in mining business and shoe-manufacturing industry.  
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manufactures miniature transformers or other daily necessities made out of electric wire to 
sell at the market, when the resource is not secured for the main production. The profit from 
this activity is used for distribution to workers, for covering expenses of the factory, and for 
informal income of executives.  
Lastly, at the stage of disposal of produced goods, the market seems to take a bigger 
role. Enterprises secure finance by selling produced goods directly or indirectly through the 
market. Participation in commercial activities of state-owned enterprises used to be found 
mainly in foreign currency earning businesses as we have seen from the previous section, yet, 
nowadays it can be observed in other fields as well.
35
 Due to an electric power shortage, 
railroads in the DPRK relying on electricity were by and large out of order, and due to the 
low state-set price the national railroad could not earn profit. Recently, as a way of earning 
income, the national railroad started to sell tickets to merchants or rich individuals at a higher 
price. When tickets are sold at an expensive price like this, it is said that diesel locomotives 
are operated and transport service is well secured. Currently, main customers for this service 
are wholesalers, and the national railroad lets emerging capitalists invest for setting up a new 
service while sharing the profit from this service with the state. In seaside towns, state-owned 
fishery enterprises also started logistics businesses by using their ships. Another example for 
state-owned enterprise’s commercial activity is the gas selling business of Ponghwa Chemical 
plant.
36
 Ponghwa Chemical plant is a refinery that refines crude oil transported by the oil 
pipeline from China. Liquefied gas produced from this plant is being sold to areas in P’
yŏngyang and it is reported that even the delivery services to the households are provided by 
private gas sellers in P’yŏngyang . On top of earning their own income, through the market, 
enterprises also try to meet their obligations of the PDS to the workers. Since enterprises 
cannot supply the goods which should have been given under the PDS, a part of products 
manufactured by the enterprises themselves are given to workers instead, and workers can 
exchange this at the market with cash or goods necessary for life.  
 
The authorities and private enterprises 
 
Regarding private enterprises, the authorities turn a blind eye on activities of private 
enterprises on one hand, and try to control them on the other hand. First, there have been 
strong censorship and control over private enterprises since 2007 such as the joint censorship 
of the State Security Department (Kukkabowibu), The Security Command (Powisaryŏngbu), 
and the Ministry of People's Security (Inminboansŏng) in March 2008.37 Later on, an 
                                          
35 Daily NK 2015-02-05, RFA 2015-07-16  
36 RFA 2015-05-29, Daily NK 2015-06-24  
37 Onŭlŭi pukhansosik (North Korea Today). 2008-04-09 
Joint censorship was made on the companies that individuals invested and borrowed the name of state-
organizations and enterprises.  
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intensive control in 2009 shut down foreign currency earning enterprises and restaurants run 
by individuals.
38
 However, the state took an action that promotes privatization and expansion 
of private enterprises as well. ‘8.3 work’39, which allows not to attend group work when a 
price is paid for it, is more or less systemized and prevalent in North Korea these days. 
Traditionally in socialist states, most adults are assigned workplaces by the state, and private 
economic activity is not allowed officially. In North Korea, however, after the collapse of the 
state economy, the population started to participate in private economic activities, and the 
state lost control over workers of state-owned farms, factories and enterprises. 8.3 work is 
said to have expanded even more recently, due to the pressure of earning ‘loyal foreign 
currency funds’.40 Executives of factories or enterprises recommend workers not to attend 
collective labor, but rather earn money from outside and pay ‘8.3 money’. The more 8.3 
money is paid, the lower the duty for enforced mobilization and compulsory attendance, and 
the population prefers to pay 8.3 money which guarantees more income by participating in 
market activities.
41
  
 Another noteworthy point about the stance of the authorities towards private 
enterprises lies in the Enterprise Act of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter, 
Enterprise Act), proclaimed in November 2010.
42
 Article 12 (Grounds for organizing 
enterprises) announces that “Demand of institutions, enterprises, and associations is also able 
to organize enterprises” and Article 13 (Request for organizing enterprises) states as follows: 
“Institutions, enterprises and associations who wish to organize enterprises should submit an 
application to the organizations in charge of the corresponding enterprises. The applications 
should contain the name of the enterprise, the number of employees, the category of business, 
relevant indices and the scale of business”. These articles show the possibility for embracing 
private capital to establish businesses such as restaurants, shops, trading companies, factories 
and other types of enterprises (Kim and Yang 2014: 68). 
 
4.2.3 At the level of local party officials focusing on corruption 
 
The prevalence of bribery is often considered to be one of the noticeable features of North 
Korean economy. Borrowing the notions from Rose-Ackerman (1978), corruption can be 
classified into two categories, that is, grand corruption and petty corruption in terms of degree. 
Grand corruption typically works at the level of high-ranking bureaucrats and politicians on a 
                                          
38 NK chishikinyŏndae  2010-01-14  
39 8.3 work originates from ‘8.3 goods production movement’ or ‘8.3 line’ led by Kim Chŏng-il on August 3rd 
1984, which originally means production of byproduct from waste materials.  
40 Daily NK  2014-07-02. ‘Loyalty foreign currency funds’ is sent to the finance of Office #39 and composes 
private property of Kim Chŏng-ŭn. ‘Loyalty foreign currency fund‘ is collected not only from foreign currency 
earning business but also from the population individually as the economic crisis became severe.  
41 New Focus International 2013-09-04 “In North Korea, you have to pay for a day off”, Daily NK 2014-08-04  
42 Enterprise Act of DPRK was not officially made public. Here sources rely on the article about Enterprise Act 
of DPRK at http://www.tongilnews.com/. For more details about Enterprise Act, see Park, Whon-Il (2012).  
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large-scale and is often combined with one-time transactions. Petty corruption, in contrast, 
occurs at lower levels of administrative officials with exchange of smaller value. It is related 
to people’s daily life, for example extortion of policemen on the street or paying bribes to 
facilitate bureaucratic processes. Even though the scale of corruption itself is smaller than 
grand corruption, petty corruption is more pervasive in the everyday life of the North Korean 
population. In this chapter, we examine the way North Korean local party officials and 
security personnel are condoning or even promoting market participation of the population 
through petty corruption. First, we look at the background that enables the existence of petty 
corruption and we see the examples and the impact of petty corruption in the DPRK. 
 The survey of Kim (2010) based on data collected from 225 North Korean refugees 
who escaped from North Korea mostly in 2007-2009 proves that bribery is widespread and 
household expenditures on bribes are considerably high. The average share of expenditure on 
bribes in total household spending from 1996 to 2007 was 8.95%, which corresponds to 6-7% 
of North Korean GDP. The reasons for giving bribes seem to be mainly related to market 
participation. 43.4% of bribes is made for working in markets, with 31.75% “to continue to 
work as a vendor banned by the authorities” and 11.66% “to start a vending business”. The 
survey also asked who the respondents think are the main bribe-takers according to their 
experiences. The main bribe-takers are said to be police officers with 54.7% followed by 
National Security agents with 22.4%. Both are in charge of monitoring markets and in 
particular, police officers are the first authority to deal with market participants.  
 Bribery to the authorities either at central or local level is illegal, and givers and 
takers therefore can be punished by law. However, as we have seen, bribe taking is 
widespread in the DPRK. When we assume that there are three players in bribery, which are 
the state, officials, and market participants, we can conclude that bribery is a result of finding 
the optimal response of these three players.
43
The state, responsible for monitoring and 
controlling bribery, is capable of punishing the representatives of the state who are taking 
bribe. Yet, the state chooses to turn a blind eye on it unless it reaches to the degree that 
threatens the existence of the regime, since bribery functions as complementary income for 
officials which the state cannot guarantee. For a government official, the purpose of receiving 
bribe is firstly for survival, and secondly for personal enrichment. Complete loyalty to the 
regime which punishes market participants might hinder him from surviving economically 
and disloyalty to the regime is yet too risky by bringing difficulties in surviving politically. 
Therefore, officials choose to remain partially loyal but become corrupt by receiving bribes 
from market participants. Market participants share similar interests with government 
officials. They avoid challenging the regime directly since it is too risky in the current North 
Korean regime, but choose to continue participating in markets by bribing government 
officials. Bribery has become one of the survival strategies in North Korea when the state 
failed to operate its planned economy system properly: “Unlike officials and Party members 
in Mao’s China who had been more or less protected from food shortages during the ‘Great 
                                          
43 This approach of seeing bribery as an optimal outcome of three players owes to the analysis of Kim (2010). 
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Leap Forward’” (Smith 2015: 220), the majority of North Korea’s officials were threatened 
by poverty and hunger as the rest of the population and it became also necessary for them to 
find a way to secure food and income from non-state channels. Under this circumstance, 
enforcing state controls over private economic activities was not in the interest of the Party 
and government officials, especially not of those who were poorly paid at local level (Ibid., 
221). Party membership remained still important, but mainly for the reason that it helps them 
to gain more private gains by being engaged in private economy activities. 
 Government officials at the middle and low level in the local area earn money from 
facilitating market related activities that had previously been almost impossible and illegal. 
The collapse of the travel permit system is a good example of official bans and restrictions 
that became impotent by the official corruption (Lankov and Kim 2008: 61-63). In principle, 
North Korean people should carry travel permits when they are travelling out of their area of 
residence. The main purpose for maintaining the travel permit system is considered to control 
the flows of people and information (White Paper 2015: 179). For ordinary people, private 
travel is only permitted for family-related business. For soldiers, government employees, and 
state-run enterprise workers, a special permit system for work-related travel exists. Violations 
of the travel permit system, are punishable (Ibid., 179-181). Article 30 of the People’s 
Security Control Act mentions that “People’s Security Agency regulates the travelling 
behavior”, and Article 149 of the Administrative Punishment Act says that “In case of 
violating the ‘travel order’ or entering into a restricted area illegally, punishment such as 
warning, fine, and nonpayment labor can be imposed”. However, the system is no longer 
effective since it broke down in the mid-1990s except in the areas in the vicinity of P’
yŏngyang where the state-control directly exerts its power. The permit for domestic travel is 
issued for free in principle, however, public officials in charge of issuing the permit do not 
proceed the issuing process promptly without bribe, thus, it is becoming routinized to pay 
bribe to facilitate the administrative procedure (Ibid., 182). The interviews of North Korean 
refugees conducted by Lankov and Kim (2008) present cases of collapsed control of the 
travel permit system. None of the respondents said that travel restrictions were serious 
barriers but rather something which could be solved easily by bribe. One interviewee said 
that by paying money (500 to 1,000 won in early 1997) to a policeman who is in charge of 
controlling passenger trains, she and her mother were allowed to board on the train and were 
helped to avoid controls. Another respondent who was engaged in a relatively large-scale 
trade in the border area paid bribes to the officials for issuing a travel permit, and other 
interviews show the case that bribe even made entering into a restricted area such as Najin-
Sŏnbong SEZ (Special Economic Zone) possible. In this way, trade and business in North 
Korea have been maintaining cooperative relations with local officials. The amount of bribe 
depends on the purpose of travel and the place to travel, for example, it is revealed that to 
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travel to P’yŏngyang and border areas, a higher fee is required to get the travel permit.44 The 
reasons for the high price of the bribe to travel to border areas is assumed to prevent escaping 
North Korea, and also to prevent contact with foreign investors.  
 Paying a license fee for starting up a private business is another example of petty 
corruption that government officials are involved in marketization. As examined in chapter 3, 
a few private entrepreneurs in North Korea run their own mines under the name of a state 
organization. For example, after securing an abandoned mine, a businessman who started to 
develop his own coal mine in P’yŏngsŏng had to pay $3,000 to get a license for mining 
business.
45
 A part of the $3,000 was to be used as an official payment to the state as a license 
fee and the other part of it is assumed to be paid as bribes to political organizations. As in the 
case of coal mining business, also shellfish aquaculture business requires a license fee, for 
instance, about $3,000 for the license to enter the sea in addition to $1,200 of official tax to 
the Ministry of Land in 2005 (Kim and Yang 2014: 62). There is no clear cut to what extent 
the money was used as tax and to what extent it was bribe, yet, it can be assumed that a great 
deal of the amount was required to get a license fee.  
 It becomes apparent that the Party stopped functioning as a “reliable transmission 
belt for ideological education and revolutionary principle” (Smith 2015: 212), in particular at 
the level of local government officials. Local government officials work as promoters of 
market participation rather than controllers of it, since they have become less capable to carry 
out their propagandistic function. Yet, we should not conclude that the involvement of party 
officials in marketization would bring political liberalization soon. Executions for political 
reasons, such as dissent to the regime, are still in practice and the freedom of criticizing the 
regime is still absent in North Korea. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that party officials are 
being increasingly involved in marketization, since the situation provides strong incentives to 
accept bribes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
44 RFA 2012-06-18. Defectors who escaped in early 2000s and mid-2000s said that before the 2000s P’
yŏngyang was the most difficult city to get travel permit. Bribe required for travel permit to P’yŏngyang as 
about 10kg of rice, which is twice more expensive than bribe for other cities. According to them, border cities 
require more bribe but less than that for P’yŏngyang. However, a recent interview with North Korean resident 
shows that people should pay more to get a travel permit for a border city such as Sinŭichu and Kaesŏng, and 
Najin-Sŏnbong district, than to travel to P’yŏngyang .  
45 See the article Daily NK 2015-04-09 which was discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis.  
28 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
 In this thesis, I discussed marketization taking place in North Korea, not only 
focusing on the growth of consumer goods markets, but as an expansion of market 
mechanism embedded into the framework of socialist planning economy, and marketization 
in the DPRK as a phenomenon that exists and operates within the political structure in 
cooperation with the state. Planning economy is complemented by market structures that 
organize the allocation of resources in the society such as labor and capital.  
In chapter 3, we discussed marketization in North Korea focusing on small-scale 
privatization, which is closely tied to an emerging new form of labor market with division of 
labor. As private ownership is not officially allowed in the DPRK, marketization exists in the 
shadow of the state’s turning a blind eye on it.  
 In chapter 4, we looked at marketization in a broader political context under the 
assumption that there exists a certain power related to the state which works with 
marketization. While keeping in mind that the state itself participates as a market player or as 
a regulator of the market, and that the state sets up exclusive institutions for a small subset of 
the society, we started our analysis from examining the foreign currency earning business and 
trading companies. We have seen, even though being operated under the state control, how 
foreign currency earning business is associated with markets through transactions of Wak, 
relying on individual merchants, exchanging payment received for submitting export goods 
with other goods at the market, and distribution of import goods. Then we moved our 
attention to the non-foreign currency earning business sector, by looking at how state-
factories and enterprises are cooperating with the market at the respective step of carrying out 
the plan. In the last part of the chapter, I examined the association of local party officials with 
the market focusing on corruption. Government officials at the middle and low level earn 
money from facilitating market related activities that had been almost impossible before, such 
as loosening the travel permit system and tolerating private businesses against a license fee.  
Starting from 2012 until present, the DPRK regime has been working on ‘6.28 policy’ 
called ‘our style economic management’. Despite the intention of imposing incentives to 
economic subjects by allowing a certain degree of autonomy, pilot operations did not work 
out, and it seems that the regime continues figuring out new methods for improving 
productivity in both industrial and agricultural sectors. However, the fact that the new 
economic management in the agricultural sector still adheres to the collective farm system, 
while in the industrial sector it sticks to the state-owned enterprise system, can be interpreted 
as an adjustment in the current system rather than a system-transforming reform. At the 7
th
 
Congress of the WPK the will to expand a new economic management was announced, 
however, no word as ‘reform’ or ‘market’ was used and mention about self-financing 
enterprises was made cautiously. In the new year address of 2017, ‘our style economic 
management’ was not mentioned, while the 5-year plan for the national economic 
development was stressed. No specific plans were presented for the economic management, 
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which is presumably due to the intense international sanctions and difficult conditions for 
exporting coal because of the nuclear development.
46
 Another reason for the tardy progress 
of the new economic management can be attributed to resistance of the people who owned 
vested interest before as in the case of reorganizing working groups in collective farms, and 
to a lack of capability to solve the transitional imbalance of resources (Park 2013: 21-35).  
 It is complicated to estimate the privatization level, the size of the labor market apart 
from the state planning, the size of markets related to foreign currency earning business and 
state-enterprises for two reasons. Firstly, there are cases where there is no clear cut between 
private sector and the planned sector since these two sectors are intermingled such as the 
former working in the structure of the latter or the other way around. Secondly, most of the 
case studies rely on the refugee interviews, which could be leaned too much towards a 
specific group of the population. Nevertheless, we have witnessed the changes taking place in 
North Korea tied to marketization such as expansion of markets, the formation of new labor 
markets, the emergence of the new rich, the increase of transactions at markets, party 
official’s increased involvement in market activities, and so on. Examining the changes in the 
DPRK is not aiming to idealize marketization as a goal of the DPRK regime, but rather to 
understand the meaning of the changes and to prospect the future trajectory of it. The 
conclusion that these changes lead to transformation to capitalism directly or would bring 
political liberalization soon seems to be premature. To examine the continuity or 
discontinuity of the new economic management remains as an important area for further 
studies, along with collation of more reliable data from refugee interviews. 
                                          
46 RFA 2017-01-18  
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A9%EB%AC%B8%ED%95%98%EA%B8%B0+%EC%96%B4%EB%A0%A4%EC%9A%
B4 
 
RFA 2015-05-29 “Puk Ponghwahwahak LPG changmadangsŏ pulti” (LPG from Pongwha 
Chemical Company is popular in Changmadang). 
http://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/food_international_org/lpg-
05292015094417.html?searchterm:utf8:ustring=%EB%B4%89%ED%99%94%ED%99%94
%ED%95%99 
 
RFA 2015-07-16 “Puk ch’ŏltosŏng, suhwamul unsong sŏpisŭ kaesi” (North Korean national 
railroad jumped into transportation business). 
http://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/food_international_org/delivery-
07162015153957.html?searchterm:utf8:ustring=%EC%B2%A0%EB%8F%84%EC%84%B1
+%EC%88%98%ED%99%94%EB%AC%BC+%EC%9A%B4%EC%86%A1 
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RFA 2015-08-04   “Puge kaein kwangsanju tŭngjang” (Appearance of individual mine 
owners in North Korea).  
http://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/ne-je-
08042015094017.html?searchterm:utf8:ustring=%EB%B6%81%EC%97%90+%EA%B0%9
C%EC%9D%B8+%EA%B4%91%EC%82%B0%EC%A3%BC+%EB%93%B1%EC%9E%
A5 
 
RFA 2016-10-17 “Puk, chungkuksŏ okkam suip kŭpchŭng” (Sharp increase in import of 
fabric from China). 
http://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/food_international_org/fabricimport-
10172016084437.html?searchterm:utf8:ustring=%EC%A4%91%EA%B5%AD%EC%84%9
C+%EC%98%B7%EA%B0%90+%EC%88%98%EC%9E%85+%EA%B8%89%EC%A6%9
D 
 
RFA 2017-01-09 “Puk’anŭi sŏbich’a, sŏbipŏsnŭl asinayo” (Do you know ‘Servicecar, 
Servicebus’ in North Korea?). 
http://www.rfa.org/korean/weekly_program/c27dac8c-d480c5b4bcf4b294-bd81d55c-
bb3cac00/priceindex-
01052017152045.html?searchterm:utf8:ustring=%EC%84%9C%EB%B9%84%EC%B0%A8 
 
RFA 2017-01-18 “Pukhan sinyŏnsae tamgin ttŭt” (The implication of the new year address of 
the DPRK). 
http://www.rfa.org/korean/commentary/ae40d0dcc6b0-ce7cb7fc/ktwcu-
01182017093912.html?searchterm:utf8:ustring=%EB%B6%81%ED%95%9C+%EC%8B%A
0%EB%85%84%EC%82%AC 
 
 
 
Etc online sources  
 
http://world.moleg.go.kr/KP/law/19128?astSeq=585 (North Korea Laws Information Center) 
 
NK chishikinyŏndae  2010-01-14  “Puk, poansŏng ’50-il chŏnt’u kaesi” (North Korean 
Ministry of People's Security commands ’50-days combat). 
http://www.nkis.kr/board.php?board=nkisb201&page=25&command=body&no=143 
 
New Focus International 2013-09-04 “In North Korea, you have to pay for a day off” 
http://newfocusintl.com/north-korea-pay-day/ 
 
